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This paper studies the impact of bank capital regulation on business cycle 
fluctuations. In particular, we study the procyclical nature of Basel II claimed in 
the literature. To do so, we adopt the Bernanke et al. (1999) ``financial 
accelerator" model (BGG), to which we augment a banking sector. We first study 
the impact of a negative shock to entrepreneurs' net worth and a positive 
monetary policy shock on business cycle fluctuations. We then look at the impact 
of a negative net worth shock on business cycle fluctuations when the minimum 
capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent. Our comparison 
studies between the augmented BGG model with Basel I bank regulation and the 
one with Basel II bank regulation suggest that, in the presence of credit market 
frictions and bank capital regulation, the liquidity premium effect further amplifies 
the financial accelerator effect through the external finance premium channel, 
which, in turn, contributes to the amplification of Basel II procyclicality. Moreover, 
under Basel II bank regulation, in response to a negative net worth shock, the 
liquidity premium and the external finance premium rise much more if the 
minimum bank capital requirement increases, which, in turn, amplify the 
response of real variables. Finally, small adjustments in monetary policy can 
result in stronger response in the real economy, in the presence of Basel II bank 
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 1 Introduction
The crucial role played by the ¯nancial sector in an economy can not be emphasized by anything other than
the consequences of an unstable ¯nancial sector. For instance, among many alleged causes of the 2007/08
¯nancial crisis, the instability of the ¯nancial sector, more speci¯cally the banking sector, stands out and is
reported to have contributed signi¯cantly to the emergence of the crisis.
For a long time, macroeconomic models have been built without the ¯nancial sector, in particular, the
credit market frictions which are often the major sources of economic crises (Bernanke, 2007). Since the
ground breaking work of Bernanke et al. (1999), there has been a growing interest in research on credit
market frictions and how they a®ect business cycle °uctuations. Most of these studies seem to reach the
same conclusion: the existence of credit market frictions tends to amplify and propagate the business cycle
°uctuations through what is known as the \¯nancial accelerator". This line of research has been extended
to study the role of bank capital regulation in business cycle °uctuations and suggests that bank capital
regulation also has signi¯cant potential to exacerbate this behavior. That is, in an imperfect credit market
environment, a risk-based capital requirement tends to be procyclical since risk is countercyclical. As a
result, the accelerator mechanism generates a feedback loop between the credit market and the real side of
the economy, amplifying business cycle °uctuations.
Bank capital regulation has received more attention since the introduction of the Basel Capital Adequacy
Accord (Basel I) by the Bank for International Settlements' Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in
1988. The Basel II Accord was introduced in 2004 to deal with the main shortcomings of Basel I, such as the
\one size ¯ts all" weighted-risk classi¯cations. However, though still debatable, it has been discovered that
Basel II has an even bigger potential to be procyclical than its predecessor (Kashyap and Stein, 2004). The
recent Basel III agreement (BCBS, 2010) was introduced to deal with the areas of weakness in the current
international bank capital regulation framework exposed by the 2007/08 ¯nancial crisis, such as excessive on-
and o®-balance sheet leverage, accompanied by a gradual erosion of the level and quality of the capital base,
and insu±cient liquidity bu®ers. It is worth noting that the liquidity requirement proposed in Basel III is still
controversial. For example, tighter liquidity requirements might have the potential to amplify business cycle
°uctuations. In our opinion, there exists the danger of knee-jerk regulations in the sense that Basel III shall
already be implemented whereas neither its liquidity channel implications nor the macroeconomic e®ects of
Basel I and II are fully understood yet. In this study, we decide to focus on a thorough investigation of the
macroeconomic implications of Basel I and II whereby we abstract from any liquidity channel implications.
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of bank capital regulation on business cycle °uctuations
using a general equilibrium framework. In particular, our aim is to investigate the procyclical nature of Basel
II claimed by most studies (both theoretical and empirical) in the literature. To do so, we augment the BGG
model by including a banking sector with bank capital regulations, which allows us to study the dynamic
impact of the ¯nancial intermediation on business cycle °uctuations not only from the ¯nancial accelerator
e®ect (demand side) perspective, but also from the liquidity premium e®ect (supply side) perspective. We
then calibrate our model to the South African economy1 and study three di®erent scenarios. We ¯rst look
1South Africa is a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), complying with the committee's
2at the impulse responses of the key variables to a negative net worth shock as well as a positive monetary
policy shock. We then study the impact of a negative net worth shock on business cycle °uctuations when
the minimum capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent. For all cases, we compare the
augmented BGG model with Basel I regulation, with the model with Basel II regulation. Our simulation
results show that, in the presence of credit market frictions and bank capital regulation, the liquidity premium
e®ect further ampli¯es the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect through the external ¯nance premium channel, which,
in turn, contributes to the ampli¯cation of Basel II procyclicality. Moreover, under Basel II regulation,
in reaction to a negative net worth shock, the liquidity premium and the external ¯nance premium rise
much more if the minimum bank capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent, which, in turn,
ampli¯es the response of the real variables, investment and output in particular. However, under Basel I
regulation, the increase in the minimum bank capital requirement does not make a signi¯cant di®erence in
terms of the impulse responses of the key variables to the shock. Finally, small adjustments in the monetary
policy rate can result in a stronger response than expected in the real economy, in the presence of Basel II
regulation in particular, which is undesirable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews the related literature of
credit market frictions and bank capital regulation. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the model.
Section 4 discusses the simulation results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The realization that ¯nancial frictions can shed some light into the analysis of business cycle °uctuations
emerged from the work of Fisher (1933) on the role played by debt and de°ation in building up to the
Great Depression. The pioneers of the recent work on ¯nancial frictions are Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki (1998), Iacoviello (2005), and Liu et al.
(2010), in which authors attempt to model ¯nancial frictions in a general equilibrium setting. The general
theme of these studies is that as long as the pricing of loans is a function of the borrower's default risk,
a wedge would open up between the lending rate and the deposit rate, when the borrower's net worth
decreases and the default probability increases. As a result, the external ¯nance premium increases, leading
to high costs of borrowing, and, in turn, reduces investment and output. Bernanke et al. (1999) de¯ne this
e®ect as the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect, which is simply the resulting feedback loop between credit markets
and the real side of the economy2. More recently, researchers have started incorporating not only credit
market constraints but also ¯nancial intermediation into general equilibrium models. Among others, Curdia
and Woodford (2009) and Andres and Arce (2009) introduce the banking sector along with a time-varying
spread between lending and deposit rates, while Markovic (2006), Van den Heuvel (2008), and Meh and
Moran (2008) look at the role of a bank capital channel in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks.
The drawback of the above-mentioned studies is that they only focus on the demand side of credit
legislation. South Africa is among the ¯rst group of countries to implement Basel II (in January 2008) and it has been
commended for a successful and smooth implementation (IMF, 2008).
2Recent work on this topic include Cooley et al. (2004), De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), Christiano et al. (2010), Gertler et al.
(2007), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009).
3market. That is, the external ¯nance premium solely depends on the borrowers' creditworthiness. Hence,
in a perfectly competitive environment (assumed in these models), banks seem to operate in a frictionless
environment and, in order to survive, banks just have to ¯nd their way around credit demand frictions.
Models that capture the supply side of credit market are slowly trickling into the literature. Gerali et al.
(2010) show that factors of the supply side of the credit market, such as the degree of competition in the
banking sector, policies on bank rates setting, and banks' ¯nancial soundness, play an equally important role
as the demand side of the credit market in business cycle °uctuations. Angelini et al. (2010) distinctively
allow for credit risk to vary according to borrowers' groups and bring in a risk-sensitive capital requirement
in the model. They ¯nd that banks' lending activities as well as real economic activities can be a®ected by
various bank capital regulations.
Financial sector regulation, especially regulation in the banking sector, is a challenge to policy makers and
regulators because of its dual-purpose nature. The main objective of ¯nancial sector regulation is to address
market failures such as externalities, market power, and asymmetric information (Drumond, 2008). It also
has to protect the fundamental functions of the banking sector, such as e±cient money lending (Kashyap
and Stein, 2004). The bank capital regulation system currently used in most countries is Basel II. Basel II is
not a law per se, but a set of minimum capital standards by which banks are expected to abide. The main
objective of Basel II is to ensure the soundness and safety of individual banks and hence the stability of the
¯nancial sector and the economy as a whole.
However, as argued by Amato and Fur¯ne (2004), the banking system is already procyclical by nature
due to market imperfection. That is, banks' lending activities co-move with business cycle °uctuations
even in the absence of regulation. Basel II, though it has been designed to foster stability in the ¯nancial
system, also has the potential to further amplify the °uctuations. As a result, it exacerbates the inherent
procyclicality in the banking sector. Moreover, under Basel II, the increase in the minimum bank capital
requirement triggered by a downturn can adversely a®ect banks' lending activities. Eventually investment
and output will decline, deepening the downturn.
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the procyclical nature of Basel II. Drumond (2008)
undertakes a thorough survey of the existing literature and reaches the following conclusion: the extent
and scale of the procyclicality of Basel II are largely in°uenced by the way minimum capital requirement
changes along the business cycle. In other words, factors such as the composition of banks' asset portfolios,
the approach adopted by banks to compute the minimum capital requirement (the standard approach or
the internal rating based approach), the type of rating system (through-the-cycle or point-in-time), and the
degree of capitalization over and above the regulatory minimum required, play a major role in banks' lending
and loan pricing decisions during di®erent phases of the business cycle. The countercyclical nature of credit
risk, which is positively related to the minimum capital requirement, is veri¯ed as the main driving factor of
the observed procyclicality of Basel II. The extent of the procyclicality of Basel II increases when banks use
the internal based rating (IRB) approach, since capital requirement gets more sensitive to the credit risk,
and the magnitude of procyclicality depends on the risk model used by banks and the composition of the
pool of banks' clients.
43 A Model with Bank Capital
In order to study how bank capital regulation a®ects bank lending activities and business cycle °uctuations,
we augment the BGG model with a banking sector along the line of Aguiar and Drumond (2007). The
model economy consists of households, entrepreneurs, retailers, banks, and a government. Households supply
labor, consume retail goods, save through bank deposits, and invest in government bonds and banks' equity.
Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods using labor and physical capital. Physical capital are ¯nanced by
net worth and the external funds obtained from banks. Banks raise capital by collecting deposits from
households and issuing bank equity to households. Banks provide credit to entrepreneurs subject to the
risk-based capital requirements. A retail sector is introduced as a technical modeling device to incorporate
price stickiness. The model is closed by including a government that conducts ¯scal policy and monetary
policy.
3.1 Banks
Banks operate in a competitive market environment with unrestricted entry, in which each bank earns zero
pro¯ts in equilibrium. We assume that banks raise funds by collecting deposits from households and issuing
bank equity to households. Banks are required by the regulator to hold a certain percentage of risk-based
capital according to the Basel Accords. In addition, banks have to pay a monitoring cost if they wish to
observe entrepreneurs' realized return to capital. Banks maximize their pro¯ts subject to the balance sheet
constraint (2) and the capital requirement constraint (3):
max(Rl









where Lt denotes loans supplied by banks to entrepreneurs, Dt denotes bank deposits, St is bank capital
raised by issuing equity to households, and ¸ is the ratio of risk-based capital requirement according to
Basel Accords. Rl
t and Rd
t represent the gross return on loans and deposits respectively, while Rs
t is the
gross return on bank capital. Government bond Bt appears on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet,
which has zero weight in the risk-based capital. The monitoring cost, ¹¤Rk
tQt¡1Kt, is explained in detail
in Section 3.2.
The optimality conditions imply that the lending rate is a function of the weighted average of the deposit
rate and the return to bank equity:
Rl
t = ¸Et¡1Rs
t + (1 ¡ ¸)Rd
t (4)
53.2 The ¯nancial contract
As in BGG, in order to explicitly motivate lending and borrowing, it is assumed that only entrepreneurs
borrow from the banks. Entrepreneurs use physical capital and labor to produce the wholesale goods and
sell to retailers. In order to produce the wholesale goods in period t, the representative entrepreneur i (where
i 2 [0;1]) uses her net worth Ni
t accumulated from previous periods to acquire physical capital Ki
t, for which
the entrepreneur pays Qt¡1 per unit. In a case where the capital expenditure exceeds the net worth, the
representative entrepreneur is able to ¯nance the shortfall through the loan Li
t from a bank made available
to her at the cost of Rl
t. Hence, the loan function is given by Li
t = Qt¡1Ki
t ¡ Ni
t. Due to the uncertainty
(aggregate and idiosyncratic) inherent in this contract, the return to capital observed before the contract is
signed is given by !iRk
t, where !i is an idiosyncratic shock to each entrepreneur in the market. Moreover,
because of the information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the bank in the ¯nancial contract,
the entrepreneur can, at no cost, observe the return on her venture beforehand, whereas the involved bank
has to pay a monitoring cost to observe the ex ante risks involved in the entrepreneur's operation. The
monitoring cost that the bank has to pay is a fraction of the actual gross payo® of the entrepreneur's capital,
¹!iRk
tQt¡1Ki
t, where 0 < ¹ < 1.
Like any contracts, there is a possibility that the entrepreneur may default, in which case the bank loses.
Let Zi
t be a gross non-default loan rate and ¹ !i be a threshold level, below which the entrepreneur defaults
and above which the entrepreneur honors the contract. Put di®erently, if !i ¸ ¹ !i, the entrepreneur pays the
bank an amount Zi
tLi
t = ¹ !iRk
tQt¡1Ki
t and keeps her share of the returns (!i ¡ ¹ !i)Rk
tQt¡1Ki
t. However, if
!i < ¹ !i, the entrepreneur defaults and the bank gets (1 ¡¹)!iRk
tQt¡1Ki
t upon paying the monitoring cost.
Given the state-contingent debt form of the optimal contract, the expected return to the entrepreneur is
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tQt¡1Ki
t] (5)
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That is, the bank's portfolio is made up of two components: the loan repayments expected from the en-




t = ¹ !iRk
tQt¡1Ki
t into (6) and rearranging the function yields:
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tLi







As Bernanke et al. (1999) show, the bank's expected return is now expressed as a function of the threshold
value ¹ !i, indicating that changes in ¹ !i can a®ect the bank's expected return in two di®erent ways. An
6increase in ¹ !i raises the non-default payo® and, at the same time, it also raises the default probability which
ultimately leads to a low expected payo®.
As per the model, it is possible to aggregate entrepreneurs and establish a common threshold level ¹ !,
since all entrepreneurs face the same external ¯nance premium and leverage ratio at the optimum. Therefore,




Solving the optimal contract results in a positive relationship between the ratio of capital expenditure to













Ã(1) = 1; Ã0(¢) > 0 (8)








, must be greater than or equal to one. Moreover, the expected discounted return to capital






This relationship is the core of the BGG ¯nancial accelerator model, as it shows the expected discounted
return to capital, which can be interpreted as the external ¯nance premium3 and which is negatively related
to the share of the entrepreneur's capital that is ¯nanced by net worth (Bernanke et al., 1999, pg. 16).
The entrepreneur's net worth consists of the retained proceeds from previous periods' capital invest-
ment and wages earned from labor supply. Normalizing the entrepreneurial labor to one, the aggregate
entrepreneurs' net worth equation can be written as follows:
Nt = °Vt¡1 + We
t¡1 (9)
where Vt represents the entrepreneurial equity, We
t¡1 represents the entrepreneurial wage income, and ° is
the constant probability of entrepreneurs surviving to the next period. In equilibrium the aggregate equity
held by entrepreneurs in the end of period t ¡ 1 is:
Vt = Rk
tQt¡1Kt ¡ Rl
t(Qt¡1Kt ¡ Nt) ¡ ¹¤Rk
tQt¡1Kt (10)
where ¹¤Rk




In this section, we incorporate into the general equilibrium model the optimality conditions of the ¯nancial
contract between the entrepreneurs and the banks, derived in a partial equilibrium setting in the previous
section. Variables such as the risk-free interest rates, the return to capital, and the relative price of capital






is interpreted as the external ¯nance premium. After augmenting the BGG model with ¯nancial






. We nonetheless interpret it as the external
¯nance premium.
4We closely follow the setup of the general equilibrium as in BGG. Here we only brie°y describe the modi¯ed household
sector and the setup for the entrepreneurial sector, as these are critical to the model.
73.3.1 Households
The model economy consists of identical, risk averse, and in¯nitely lived households, who supply labor to
entrepreneurs, consume, save (bank deposits), and invest in government bonds and bank equity. The rep-
resentative household chooses fCt;Bt;Dt;St g to maximize its expected discounted utility over a composite














where ¯ is the subjective discount factor and ´h is the inverse of the elasticity of work e®ort with respect
to the real wage. ´c is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion of the household, and ´d is the inverse of the
interest elasticity of real deposit demand.































t represents nominal wage for households and Tt is the nominal lump sum transfer from government.
Similar to the money-in-utility function, bank deposits are included in households' utility function. We
assume that households can withdraw the deposits at any point in time to purchase consumption goods. In
other words, deposits not only provide riskless return but also liquidity services to households5.
3.3.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs operate in a competitive market. At the beginning of time period t, entrepreneurs purchase
Kt¡1 units of physical capital and hire Ht units of labor to produce the wholesale goods Yt according to the




t 0 < ® < 1 (13)
where At is the exogenously determined technology. At the end of each period, entrepreneurs sell their
output to the retailers at a price of 1
Xt, where Xt is the gross mark-up of retail goods over wholesale goods.
The rent of physical capital, 1
Xt
®Yt
Kt , has to be paid at the end of each period. This yields the expected gross
return to physical capital:
Et¡1(Rk
t) = Et¡1[
#t + (1 ¡ ±)Qt
Qt¡1
] (14)




As mentioned in the previous section, to enable entrepreneurs to start their operations with a positive
level of net worth, the model assumes that entrepreneurs supply their labor inelastically. As a result, total
labor supply Ht is rede¯ned in the following manner: Ht = (Hh
t )­(He
t )1¡­ with 0 < ­ < 1, where Hh
t
5See Van den Heuvel (2008).
8and He
t represent households' labor supply and entrepreneurs' labor supply respectively. Consequently, the




t )1¡­]1¡® 0 < ® < 1 (15)
Demand functions for labor (both households and entrepreneurs) are derived by equating the respective





















Output can be consumed by households, entrepreneurs, and government, it may be invested by en-
trepreneurs, or it may be used by banks to pay the monitoring costs. Thus, the aggregate resource can be
described as follows:
Yt = Ct + Ce
t + It + Gt + ¹¤Rk
tQt¡1Kt (18)
At this juncture, two important equations determine the ¯nancial accelerator. The ¯rst is the aggregated
version of (8), the supply function for aggregated investment ¯nance, which shows how changes in net worth
a®ect the cost of capital. The second equation characterizes the inherent variation in entrepreneurs' net
worth. It is derived by merging equation (9), (10), (13) and (17), assuming that entrepreneurs supply a
single unit of labor:
Nt = °[Rk
tQt¡1Kt ¡ Rl
t(Qt¡1Kt ¡ Nt) ¡ ¹¤Rk







The Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) Committee on Banking Supervision administers the current
framework of minimum bank capital regulation. Among other objectives, the Basel accords are meant to
promote safety and soundness in the ¯nancial system through risk-based capital requirements (BCBS, 2006,
pg. 2). Under Basel I, each bank is subjected to a minimum capital requirement of 8 percent, which is
measured as a ratio of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted asset. Weights are determined by the committee
according to the institutional nature of the banks' clients, presumably revealing their risk pro¯les (BCBS,
1988). For trustworthy institutions like government, banks have the liberty of granting loans to them out of
deposits without holding any of their capital against such loans. Hence, the weight attached to such loans
is zero. In contrast, a weight of 0.2 is applied for loans between banks; 0.5 for loans backed by residential
mortgages asset, and 1 for industrial and commercial loans (Drumond, 2008, pg. 12)6. This \one size ¯ts
6The di®erential weighting coe±cients discussed here are applied by members of the OECD.
9all" approach of risk classi¯cation is short sighted since it only looks at risk from a general point of view,
instead of looking at it on an institution-to-institution basis. It increases the likelihood of systemic risk
through capital arbitrage (cherry picking) since banks can change the composition of their portfolios by
acquiring high-risk assets in low-risk categories without increasing their capital requirements. As such, risk
classi¯cation under Basel I is not correlated with real banking risk (see Rime (2001) and Drumond (2008)).
In contrast to Basel I, Basel II is founded on three pillars and each pillar focuses on a particular segment of
the banking system. Pillar one, the most relevant one to this study, deals with minimum capital requirements
associated with credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. The credit risk calculation is based on not only
the broader borrowers' groups, but also the risk pro¯le of individual borrowers within the group (BCBS,
2006). Basel II is designed in such a way that bank capital requirements are more risk sensitive as the
amount of capital that a bank has to hold against a given exposure becomes a function of the estimated
credit exposure (Drumond, 2008). Another important element of Basel II, which gives it a sharper edge than
Basel I, is that it gives banks the liberty to choose from two approaches of credit risk calculation. Under the
standard approach, banks can rely on credit rating agencies for assessing their clients' risk. The second one
is the IRB approach, which is further sub-categorized into the foundation and advanced formats. Under this
approach, the estimated credit risk is a function of four facets: probability of default (PD), loss given default
(LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and maturity time of the loan (M). Banks that choose the advanced
format have to compute all four elements themselves, whereas those who use the foundation format only
need to compute the probability of default and the rest of the elements are taken as given from the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Kashyap and Stein, 2004).
Coming back to our model, the manner in which bank capital regulation has been introduced into the
model so far does not feature any of the characteristics of Basel II. That is, the setup for the banking
sector only captures risk based on the \one size ¯ts all" approach. Basel II, on the other hand, engages an
approach in which the credit risk calculation depends on both the institutional nature of the borrower and
the idiosyncratic risk each borrower is exposed to within a group.
By aggregating entrepreneurs coupled with the fact that credit risk is countercyclical, we can study how
the Basel II accord a®ects business cycle °uctuations. According to the IRB approach of the Basel II accord
(BCBS, 2006, pg. 64), the capital requirement (CR) is given by,
CR = LGD £ ©[(1 ¡ ¿)¡0:5 £ ©¡1 £ PD + 0:999©¡1(
¿
1 ¡ ¿
)0:5] ¡ PD £ LGD £ M (20)
where ©(¢) is a cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable and ¿ is the asset-
value correlation which re°ects the dependence among borrowers. ¿ is assumed to be a decreasing function
of PD:
¿ =
0:12(1 ¡ exp(¡50 £ PD))
1 ¡ exp(¡50)
+ 0:24 £ [1 ¡
1 ¡ exp(¡50 £ PD)
1 ¡ exp(¡50)
] (21)
In line with the fact that under the foundation format of the IRB approach banks only need to calculate
PD, assuming a one-year loan maturity, the capital requirement can then be rewritten as:




Finally, the risk-weighted assets are expressed as CR£12:5£EAD, which results in the following capital






t = CRt £ 12:5. At this point, due to the aggregation made earlier, it is possible to impose the
same CRt for all the entrepreneurs since they are subject to the same PDt and ratio of capital to net worth.
The objective of making capital regulation more sensitive to credit risk is achieved in such way that CR¤
t
co-moves with PDt, which, in turn, depends on ¹ !. Through the ¯nancial contract, the positive relationship
between ¹ ! and the ratio of capital to net worth implies that CR¤
t is also positively related to the ratio of
capital to net worth. Aguiar and Drumond (2007) approximate this relationship as follows:
CR¤




Thus the banking sector's objective under Basel II bank regulation can be written as follows:
max(Rl





Lt + Bt = Dt + St (25)
St
Lt




The ¯rst order condition for Lt becomes:
Rl









The banks' optimality conditions imply that the bank deposit rate equals the government bond rate,
Rd
t = Rt. Substituting Rd
t = Rt into the linearized version of (27) and assuming the expected return to bank















)](qt¡1 + kt ¡ nt) (28)
7To avoid asset arbitrage, the model assumes that households are not allowed to hold physical capital and entrepreneurs
cannot hold bank capital. Therefore, any di®erence in returns that may occur as a result of exogenous shocks becomes
insigni¯cant, since these two types of capital are a®ected by the same risk and they cannot provide liquidity services.
8A lowercase letter represents its log deviation from steady state, whereas an uppercase letter without time subscript
represents its steady state.
11(28) shows that the external ¯nance premium, Et¡1rk
t ¡rl
t, is positively related to the liquidity premium9,
Et¡1rs
t ¡ rd
t, and negatively related to the net worth. It is clear that the liquidity premium has a stronger
impact on the external ¯nance premium than the net worth does. This is the key relationship in our study,
since through it, we are able to link the liquidity premium e®ect to the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect.
In the case of Basel I bank regulation, this key relationship between the external ¯nance premium and
the liquidity premium is derived from the linearized version of (4):
Et¡1rk
t ¡ rl





It is clear that under Basel I bank regulation, the positive relationship between the external ¯nance
premium and the liquidity premium also holds. (28) and (29) show that, under bank capital regulations (both
Basel I and Basel II), entrepreneurs face a much higher external ¯nance premium if the liquidity premium
increases. That is, the liquidity premium e®ect further ampli¯es the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect through the
external ¯nance premium channel, which, in turn, contributes to the ampli¯cation of the procyclicality of
bank capital regulations.
4 Simulation and Results
The baseline model is the BGG model augmented with ¯nancial intermediation10, in which the ¯nancial ac-
celerator e®ect and the liquidity premium e®ect play the central role in a®ecting business cycle °uctuations.
The ¯nancial accelerator e®ect emerges from the demand side of bank loans, whereas the liquidity premium
e®ect comes from the supply side. Net worth is procyclical as it is determined by the value of asset, and
the prices of asset co-move with the business cycle. On the other hand, the external ¯nance premium is
countercyclical. This is because the lesser entrepreneurs' net worth the higher the external ¯nance premium
is, which, in turn, results in high costs of borrowing and a decline in investment and output. The presence
of bank capital regulation leads to the emergence of the liquidity premium, which further in°ates the en-
trepreneurs' costs of borrowing since it is positively related to the external ¯nance premium. All these e®ects
generate a feedback loop, where now, the negative impact on the real side of the economy is transmitted
back to the credit market, starting the process all over again. In this way, the downturn ends up being even
deeper than it would be in the absence of bank capital regulation.
4.1 Net worth shock
The impact of an unanticipated negative net worth shock (Figure 1) works through the ¯nancial contract
between banks and entrepreneurs, where the weakened ¯nancial status of entrepreneurs increases the expected
monitoring costs, which ultimately leads to a higher external ¯nance premium. More importantly, a negative
net worth shock increases the riskiness of entrepreneurs' projects and, in turn, leads to an increase in the
default probability. The probability of default, which depends on the ratio of capital to net worth, determines
9We refer the di®erence between the rate of return to bank capital and bank deposit rate as the liquidity premium.
10See the appendix for detailed calibration. Simulation exercises are performed using Dynare developed by Michel Juillard
and his collaborators at CEPREMAP.
12Figure 1: Negative net worth shock: Basel I (solid line) vs. Basel II (dashed line)
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the minimum capital requirements for the banks. Furthermore, because of the higher risk and the increase
in bank capital, households demand a high liquidity premium to hold bank capital as it is expensive to
raise capital during the downturn11. Banks then shift the burden to entrepreneurs by further increasing
the lending rates, which makes it even more expensive for entrepreneurs to obtain the external funds. The
decline in entrepreneurs' net worth leads to a fall in the demand of physical capital, which then drags down
the price of physical capital. As a result, physical capital falls along with investment and output.
It is worth noting that both entrepreneurs' net worth and the price of physical capital revert to their
steady states within 20 quarters after the shock, whereas physical capital continues to decline. Intuitively,
it takes a much longer time to rebuild capital stock since it is the end product of factors such as investment
and net worth, which must recover ¯rst in order to facilitate capital accumulation.
The response of all key variables to the shock are much stronger under Basel II regulation than those
under Basel I regulation. As shown in Figure 1, the liquidity premium increases much more under Basel II
regulation than it does under Basel I regulation. As (28) indicates the external ¯nance premium depends
positively on the liquidity premium and negatively on the net worth. Under Basel II regulation, both the
decline in entrepreneurs' net worth and the increase in the liquidity premium contribute to the increase in
the external ¯nance premium. However, under Basel I regulation, net worth only has a direct impact on the
¯nancial accelerator e®ect.
4.2 Monetary policy shock
The monetary policy shock (Figure 2) operates through the standard asset price channel and the interest rate
channel of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. An unanticipated temporary positive monetary policy
shock reduces entrepreneurs' net worth because net worth is positively related to asset prices, whereas asset
prices are negatively related to the policy rate. Low net worth tarnishes entrepreneurs' creditworthiness,
11This is also the case if the policy rate increases.
13Figure 2: Positive monetary policy shock: Basel I (solid line) vs. Basel II (dashed line)
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which then increases the external ¯nance premium. From this point of view, the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect
unfolds: less net worth is accumulated, resulting in a lower level of capital stock in the economy and a decline
in investment and output.
It is worth noting that variables respond more strongly to the monetary policy shock than to the net
worth shock. Part of the reason for this behavior is related to the interest rate channel of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism. The policy rate not only a®ects the demand for loans through the impact
on net worth, but also discourages entrepreneurs from borrowing through the impact on the lending rates.
In this way, a contractionary monetary policy leads to a much higher borrowing cost to entrepreneurs than
the negative net worth shock does. Eventually, investment and output decrease much more in response
to a contractionary monetary policy shock than to a negative net worth shock. This indicates that small
adjustments in monetary policy can result in stronger response in the real economy, in the presence of Basel
II regulation in particular, which is particularly undesirable.
The impulse responses of all variables to both shocks are much stronger under Basel II regulation than
those under Basel I regulation. This is due to the fact that the credit risk calculation under Basel II regulation
is based on not only the broader borrowers' groups, but also the risk pro¯le of individual borrowers within
the group. In other words, bank capital requirements are more risk sensitive under Basel II regulation,
resulting in a greater increase in bank capital after the shocks, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
4.3 Increasing minimum capital requirement from 8 to 12 percent
South African banks, by choice, have had an average risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio of approximately
12 percent between 2003 and 2009 (SARB, 2009). This situation, coupled with calls from world leaders for
banks to increase their capital holdings in the aftermath of the 2007/08 ¯nancial crisis, leads to the idea
of looking at the scenario where the minimum capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent.
We therefore compare the impact of a negative net worth shock on business cycle °uctuations when the
14Figure 3: Negative net worth shock under Basel I when bank capital requirement increases from 8% (solid
line) to 12% (dashed line)
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minimum capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent under each accord.
The results show that Basel II is more procyclical than its predecessor. While increasing the ratio of
bank capital to risk-weighted asset from 8 percent to 12 percent has a very minimal impact under Basel
I regulation (Figure 3), it does result in stronger response in all key variables under Basel II regulation
(Figure 4). The small di®erence observed under Basel I regulation can be attributed to the fact that bank
capital requirements are less risk sensitive. That is, the general approach of assessing risk used under
Basel I, feeds little information regarding the actual risk into the capital requirements. Under Basel II
regulation, however, the higher minimum capital requirement implies that banks have to raise more capital
from households than under Basel I regulation, which results in an increase in the liquidity premium and,
hence, the external ¯nance premium. The high cost of borrowing eventually a®ects investment and output
adversely. Moreover, when the minimum capital requirement increases from 8 percent to 12 percent, key
variables not only deviate from the steady states by a greater magnitude, but also converge to their steady
states more rapidly, further showing the procyclical nature of Basel II.
5 Conclusions
This paper aims to investigate the impact of bank capital regulation on business cycle °uctuations, and
the procyclical nature of Basel II in particular. To this end, we calibrate a general equilibrium model with
¯nancial intermediation to the South African data. In our model, besides the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect that
existed in BGG, the liquidity premium e®ect ampli¯es the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect through the external
¯nance premium channel, which, in turn, contributes to the ampli¯cation of Basel II procyclicality. Our
simulation exercises also suggest that, in the presence of Basel II regulation, small adjustments in monetary
policy can result in a stronger response in the real economy through a decline in investment, physical
capital, and net worth, while the response of in°ation is largely unchanged. This consequence would be
15Figure 4: Negative net worth shock under Basel II when bank capital requirement increases from 8% (solid
line) to 12% (dashed line)
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As much as our results re°ect the potential procyclical nature of bank capital regulation, caution has to
be exercised when interpreting results of the model. The paper does not claim that the liquidity premium and
¯nancial accelerator e®ects are the only contributors to Basel II procyclicality. There may be other factors
such as the type of risk model used to calculate the probability of default, PD or banks' loan portfolios. The
BGG model, as much as it is potentially a useful framework to study the interactions between the ¯nancial
and the real sectors of the economy, has its own caveats. Nonetheless, further exploration and expansion of
the paper, including conducting sensitivity and robustness analysis (in particular for the relationship between
entrepreneurs' ¯nancial conditions and the ¯nance supply decisions by banks) can further ¯rm the model
and make the results more robust.
Finally, the 2007/08 ¯nancial crisis has highlighted the liquidity channel e®ect on in°uencing banks'
capacity to extend credit, and, in turn, the real side of the economy (BCBS, 2011). Therefore, future
research also aims to incorporate the liquidity channel into the model, which will allow us to investigate the
interaction and reinforcing e®ects of banks' liquidity shortage and solvency problems.
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18Appendix: Calibration
The model is calibrated to the South African economy using data from the South African Reserve Bank,
except for values of some parameters that are borrowed from the literature (see Table 1).
The steady-state ratios of households' consumption to output, government expenditure to output, invest-
ment to output, output to capital, and entrepreneurs' consumption to output are calibrated using real time
series data: C
Y = 0:58, G
Y = 0:19, I
Y = 0:16, Y
K = 0:11 and C
e
Y = 0:05. The aggregate capital depreciation
rate ± is 0.019 per quarter and capital output share ® = 0:26, values borrowed from Liu and Gupta (2007).
Due to the unavailability of the exact entrepreneurs' net worth time series data, the ratio of capital to net
worth K
N is set at 2 as in BGG.
The ratio of entrepreneurs' net worth to loans, N
L , is calibrated at 1.685; the ratio of loans to bank capital,
L
S, is calibrated at 8.35; and the ratio of loans to deposits, L
D, is calibrated at 2.15. We use the approximated
measurements for entrepreneurs' loans and bank capital time series to calculate the above-mentioned steady-
state ratios. Entrepreneurs' loans are obtained by subtracting mortgage loans for residential purposes from
the total loans and advances to the private sector, whereas the series of share capital and reserves of liabilities
of banking institution is used as the approximation of bank capital.
As far as the rates of interest are concerned, the steady-state ratio of return to physical capital to the
lending rate, R
k
Rl = 1:092, and the ratio of deposit rate to the lending rate, R
d
Rl = 0:72, are calculated using the
approximated measurements. We use the rate of return on Eskom bonds as an approximation for the return
to physical capital. The intuition is that, in the long run, the second best investment to capital projects
may be bonds of a parastatal company like Eskom. The lending rate is approximated by subtracting the
91-days Treasury bill rate from the prime overdraft rate, and adding the deposits rate. Intuitively, banks
request from borrowers a rate equal to what they pay for deposits plus a certain spread. In this case, we use




Y 0.58 Household consumption-output ratio
C
e
Y 0.05 Entrepreneurial consumption-output ratio
I
Y 0.16 Investment-output ratio
G
Y 0.19 Government expenditure-output ratio
K
N 2 Physical capital-net worth ratio
Y
K 0.11 Output-physical capital ratio
µ 0.75 Calvo sticky price parameter
Q 1 Price of physical capital in steady state
' 0.25 Elasticity of the price of physical capital to investment-capital ratio
® 0.26 Physical capital share of output
X 1.1 Gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods
¯ 0.99 Discount rate
´h 3.85 Elasticity of household labor supply
! 0.985 Share of income accruing to households
± 0.019 Physical capital depreciation rate
° 0.973 Survival probability
À 0.052 Steady state elasticity of external ¯nance premium to leverage
R
k
Rl 1.092 Ratio of return to physical capital to lending rate
R
d
Rl 0.72 Ratio of deposit rate to lending rate
K
L 3.37 Ratio of physical capital to loans
N
L 1.685 Ratio of net worth to loans
L
S 8.35 Ratio of loans to bank capital
L
D 0.91 Ratio of loans to deposits
20